How the US Projects Power in East Asia

Why does the the US have so many bases in East Asia?

The simple answer you get from Twitter types is that it’s “imperialism” or “hegemony.” These are interesting arguments, but lack depth.

The real answer is about great-power competition.

Great powers do not react to threats – they anticipate them. The U.S. bases in East Asia were built to stop Soviet expansion in East Asia. But have been reoriented to keep China from dominating their local geographical region.

That’s why the U.S. built this network of bases in the first place. After World War II, it locked in alliances with Japan, South Korea, and others to make sure no single power could take over the region.

The Pacific is a strategic buffer – and an American lake from Kyushu to San Diego. That’s by strategic design.

The layered structure of U.S. military positions across the Pacific has two main purposes:

1. Containment and Forward Defense . The US needs to project power as far as possible from the U.S. mainland. This was used to contain the USSR. Now its been pivoted to China.
2. Strategic Buffering – Creating multiple defensive layers to absorb and slow down any potential adversary’s expansion.

So how do these layers work?

Breaking down the strategic layers.

First, and Second Island chains. With Hawaii, Alaska (not pictured), South Pacific, and NZ forming the connection to the Americas.

The layers serve two roles: offensive and defensive. It gives the U.S. has reaction time and multiple fallback positions. The US can use it like spear pointed at any adversary in the Far East and South East Asia. At the same time, they can use it as a buffer.

There’s two layers you need to look at.

First Layer: The Forward Perimeter

This first and most critical layer are use U.S. military bases in allied territories closest to China. These form the first line of containment and offensive power projection.

The first island chain provides the spear and the shield for the forward perimeter for US military power in Asia.

1. Japan: The Cornerstone of U.S. Forward Defense

Japan is the most strategically important U.S. ally in Asia. It provides bases, logistics, and force projection capabilities right on China’s doorstep. Japanese prime ministers have even acknowledged this.

Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) Airborne Brigade at JGSDF Camp Fuji

1980s prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro even called it an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”.

Here’s a breakdown of US military presence:

• Okinawa (Kadena Air Base, Marine Corps Base Futenma) – Home to the largest U.S. airbase in Asia, capable of launching fighters and bombers into the East China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Also home to 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, which is forward deployed.
• Yokosuka Naval Base – Headquarters of the U.S. 7th Fleet, responsible for controlling Pacific naval dominance. A US Marine Corps amphibious assault group is based here.
• Misawa Air Base, Iwakuni, Sasebo – Hosting U.S. Air Force and Navy assets which allow them to control airspace over the Tsushima Strait, Sea of Japan, and the First Island Chain from Japan to the Philippines. Also defend against naval assets threatening Guam.

Japan is critical. If Japan were neutralized? The U.S. would lose its most powerful regional foothold and logistics base – allowing China to project power and influence into the Pacific and beyond.

U.S. forces can operate close to China and Russia without exposing the American homeland.

Japan is the key anchor in the 1st layer that prevents U.S. influence from being pushed back beyond the second island chain.

But you need Korea to close the defense line.

2. South Korea is a spear pointed at China and Russia.

Panmunjom, Joint Security Area, Demilitarized Zone, facing north towards North Korea.

The Korean War remains a frozen war for this reason. Controlling the Korean peninsula controls multiple bodies of water – air and naval superiority.

U.S. forces in South Korea primarily deter North Korea. The real reason? They also are secondary counterweight to China and Russia.

So what are the main U.S. Military Presence?

• Osan and Kunsan Air Bases: These bases are critical hubs for U.S. airpower in South Korea, hosting F-16 Fighting Falcons, A-10 Thunderbolt IIs, and KC-135 Stratotankers, which enable sustained air operations across the region. Air assets stationed here provide coverage over the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan, and the Tsushima Strait, while also posing a deterrent to Chinese naval sorties from Dalian and Russian naval movements from Vladivostok.
• Camp Humphreys: Located south of Seoul, Camp Humphreys is strategically positioned to reduce vulnerability while maintaining operational reach. As the largest U.S. overseas military base, it serves as the logistical backbone for U.S. forces in Korea, supporting troop deployments, equipment storage, and supply chains for prolonged regional conflict.
• Camp Casey and Camp Stanley: Situated near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), these bases house the 2nd Infantry Division, providing a rapid-response capability to counter potential North Korean aggression. Their proximity to the border ensures immediate readiness for ground operations.
• Daegu Air Base: This base supports U.S. Army aviation assets and serves as a key logistics hub for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), enhancing mobility and supply distribution across the peninsula.

South Korea isn’t just deterring North Korea.

It forces China to split its military focus between Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. While making it difficult for Russian naval power to transit the region.

Combined with bases in Japan, it also blocks the Tsushima Strait, a key choke point for great powers in the region.

If you look at both Japan and Korea together? They form a block that secures trade routes, transport, and power projection. Large reason why Korea is fought over so heavily by Russians, Chinese, Japanese, and Americans historically.

But this only North. What about the south?

3. The Philippines and Taiwan close the southern flank

Philippines anchors the southern strategic flank

Army of the Philippines. Yes, they have their own tanks too.

The Philippines is more than a strategic foothold—it’s a hard and diplomatic power lever.

The U.S. presence in Philippines allows Washington to shape disputes in the South China Sea. Using naval forces to balance against China. Or any other rising South East Asian power.

A divided region benefits Washington. A US dependent Philippines ensures the US can back different claimants when it serves its interests. With force projection. Where fleets arrive, diplomatic power follows.

This was true in the past, during the Vietnam War and now, by the bases in the region:

• Subic Bay supports carrier strike groups, amphibious task forces, and submarine patrols operating in the South China Sea. It serves as a resupply hub, keeping U.S. naval forces forward-deployed without relying on distant bases like Guam or Japan. Used to be a base in the Cold War, but has shifted to logistics duties.
• Clark Air Base and other airbases strengthens control over the seas around the Philippines. Maritime patrol aircraft track naval movements, ISR platforms monitor key shipping lanes, and fighters secure airspace over critical maritime chokepoints.

Map of the bases. Spratly Islands are disputed by the Philippines, China, and Vietnam over potential gas resources under the sea.

The Philippines is quite crucial. Without it, the U.S. would lose strategic access to the South China Sea, allowing Beijing a heavier hand in territorial disputes over the Nine Dash Line.

But we can’t forget Taiwan’s role in this. Like Japan and Korea, its paired with the Philippines.

Taiwan is a pin that holds the first line together.

A Taiwan that remains close to Washington reinforces the First Island Chain. It creates a chokepoint between China and the broader Pacific, combined with the Philippines. Its also close enough to China to monitor military movements, disrupt PLA Navy naval operations, and serve as a launch point for force projection in a crisis.

This benefits U.S. strategy in several ways:

• Control of Pacific Access – U.S. naval forces and allies maintain the ability to monitor and block Chinese fleet movements beyond the First Island Chain. Naval task forces that go beyond risk attack on their supply lines.
• Intelligence Operations – Taiwan’s proximity to the Chinese mainland allows it to monitor naval deployments, missile launches, and air operations in real time. It provides the U.S. and its allies with critical intelligence on Chinese military movements, giving Washington an operational advantage.
• Limited Power Projection – Without direct access to the Pacific, China is forced to move south regional power, constrained by U.S. bases and allied fleets. Taiwan provides a forward base that integrates with U.S. operations in Japan, the Philippines, and Guam.

Taiwan and the Philippines together form a strategic barrier. Taiwan holds the center. The Philippines locks down the south. Lose these, and the U.S. becomes a spectator in East Asia.

The naval gap between Taiwan and the Philippines is a chokepoint covered by land aircraft from Taiwan, Okinawa, and Philippines. Gives the US 7th Fleet in Japan and Pacific Fleet in Hawaii time to get underway

China being able to break through allows influence in the South Pacific islands, the Straits of Malaca, and even the Indian Ocean.

But these are obvious ones we know. There’s second layer that’s not mentioned:

Second Layer: The Staging Area

Okay, this is about logistics. This isn’t as exciting right? Wrong. It’s just as critical – it allows sustainment of US hard power in the Western Pacific. And diplomatic influence as well.

Sustainment is military speak for logistics.

Three places are critical for that:

1. Guam

Attack and ballistic missile subs are often forward supplied here. Along with DDGs. Bombers like the B-2 Sprit and B-52 are often based here.

Guam is America’s forward launchpad—the linchpin for projecting power across the First Island Chain. Its location makes it indispensable for keeping bombers, subs, and carrier groups within striking distance of potential hotspots.

• Supports critical air and naval assets: Guam enables the continuous operation of B-1B and B-52 bombers, F-22 and F-35 fighters, KC-135 refueling aircraft, and Virginia-class attack submarines, eliminating the need to fall back to distant bases like Hawaii or Alaska.
• Sustains naval presence: Carrier strike groups, including Nimitz and Ford-class carriers, and amphibious ready groups with Wasp-class and America-class ships, rotate through Guam to maintain a forward-deployed posture in contested waters.
• Enhances rapid response capabilities: The reopening of Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz—the first new Marine base in 70 years—hosts 5,000 Marines, bolstering the U.S. military’s ability to rapidly deploy forces across the region.

But even the best staging ground is useless, if you can’t keep it fueled, armed, and supplied. Guam can’t operate in a vacuum.

To sustain this forward presence, the U.S. needs a mid Pacific base in the pipeline stretching 6,000 miles back to the American mainland.

2. Hawaii: Command and Control.

Oahu was a major naval, army, and marine base in WW2. It forms the midpoint for all operations in the Pacific.

Hawaii is a mid-Pacific hub that bridges the continental U.S. and Guam, serving as a critical link to the First Island Chain. It also functions as a major command and control center for naval operations and ship movements across the Pacific.

There’s a reason:

• Naval power at Pearl Harbor: Pearl Harbor is the cornerstone of U.S. naval strength in the Pacific, home to Nimitz and Ford-class carrier strike groups, Los Angeles and Virginia-class submarines, and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, which operate across the region to maintain maritime dominance.
• Air Force force projection: The Air Force rotates B-1B and B-52 bombers, F-22 Raptors, and F-35 fighters through Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, ensuring continuous airpower presence and rapid response capabilities in East Asia.
• Army’s strategic reserve: The 25th Infantry Division, based at Schofield Barracks, acts as a rapid-response force, ready to reinforce U.S. troops in South Korea or support Marine operations in Okinawa during contingencies.
• Marine amphibious readiness: The Marine Corps at Marine Corps Base Hawaii (Kaneohe Bay) maintains a robust amphibious force, including 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) elements, to support expeditionary operations and reinforce U.S. presence across the Pacific.

Hawaii isn’t just a command center and ogistical and operational backbone that ties East Asian operations to the continental U.S. Without Hawaii, the U.S. would face significant challenges in sustaining power projection and operational readiness in the Pacific.

3. Alaska: Securing the Northern Air Route

Air bridge supply routes often follow the curve of the earth. So Alaska sits at a very clear air superiority choke point.

Finally, there’s Alaska. It might seem like an odd player in the Pacific, but its role is absolutely critical. Alaska isn’t a direct player its in a different command – Northern Command – unlike the other units that sit in Pacific Command.

But its a critical supply route and strategic base. Using it, the U.S. can move airlift forces into the Pacific without interference.

• Airpower Hub: Alaska hosts Eielson Air Force Base and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson. These bases are home to F-22 Raptors and F-35 Lightning IIs. These fighters control the skies over the North Pacific. They also secure U.S. air reinforcement routes. Alaska’s location makes it a natural midpoint for air routes from the U.S. to Japan and beyond.
• 11th Airborne Division – Known as the “Arctic Angels,” it’s based in Alaska. As an airborne unit, it can deploy faster than conventional forces like the 25th Infantry Division. Logistics load is lighter. So it ends up both as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for the Indo-Pacific and Arctic, ready to rapidly deploy to hotspots across the region.
• Critical Staging Point for Logistics: Alaska is a logistical hub for U.S. operations. In a time of a Pacific War? Alaska is an ammo dump. It supports Air Mobility Command (AMC) aircraft like C-17s and C-130s. With these planes move troops, ammunition, and equipment from the U.S. to forward bases in Japan, South Korea, and Guam.

Without Alaska keeping these air routes secure, the entire chain to sustain any offensive power projection or defensive front line falls apart.

But I think we need to talk less analysis – the real question is how to respond to this for China. In the US case, how to maintain it:

How would any peer adversary counter this?

Future PLA Naval aircraft carrier task forces and

Peer adversary in question is China. With Russia as a possible secondary actor.

I know the commentators will use “unlimited Dongfang misses” argument. Which is lazy wonder weapon thinking. It misses the point.

Weapons enhance tactics and force projection – wonder weapons don’t get you strategic wins.

But what would get that strategic win?

• China or Russia manages to influence Japan and South Korea. This would be difficult given the hold the US has over Japan, and the Japanese government’s willingness to navigate the US system. South Korea is more likely, given the constant shifting in political power. But it is unlikely to align with China outright.
• China retakes Taiwan, through military force, peaceful reunification, or influence over local government. Taiwan and the seas around it become a route to project power and influence eastward. Then attempts to disrupt supply lines from the continental US to the first island chain.
• Philippines realigns itself with China. This would be very difficult given the long alignment the Philippines shares with the US, leverage over the Filipino economy, and . This is not to say it can’t happen. But it would take a significant drop in legitimacy, political, and economic power for that to happen.

Directly countering US power projection in East Asia would be a matter of political opportunism. Rather than direct military force.

You’re unlikely to get Japan, Korea, and Philippines to switch sides.

But you can get them to declare enough neutrality in a possible hot war. Long enough that ties up options the US has in a South China Sea or a Taiwan scenario.

Another move is what China is doing already. Cultivating relationships with Southeast Asian nations. We’ve also seen diplomatic alignment Myanmar and Pakistan to bypass the choke point near Singapore (Strait of Malacca).

This means:

• Push the US back to the Second Island Chain. Get a political realignment in one nation of the network of allies that make up the First Island Chain.
• Control the South China Sea or influence nations around it. This opens up basing opportunities for the PLA Navy to quickly project naval and military power in the region.
• Bypass the South China Sea to project power influence in the Indian Ocean via Myanmar or Pakistan. Or find a friendly nation that frees up transit through the Straits of Malacca.

How would the US maintain this?

No analysis would be complete without looking at the other side here.

The US strategy is simple: hold the line and current policy. They need to make sure allies stay allies – by diplomacy, leverage, increased economic ties, or even treachery. Carrot and stick is quite effective.

A strategic advantage requires:

• Retaining Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Losing influence over any of the nations here? Signals a decline in military power. A withdrawal from a single one, signals a major political decline.
• Effective logistics. Since 1991, these have weakened. A war in the Pacific needs massive sea lift and airlift capacity to move troops, fuel, and munitions across thousands of miles—while under threat. The U.S. must rebuild its transport fleet and expand forward ammo and fuel dumps in Japan, the Philippines, and other First Island Chain nations. Without these, any fight is lost before it begins.
• Effective training to respond to contingencies. During the Cold War, the US regularly performed exercises to test operational readiness – to deter the USSR and reassure allies of willingness to fight. Testing how quickly QRF units like the 11th Airborne respond demonstrates strength to peer rivals. And commitment to allies in the region.

Rebuilding the economy to support this military policy would be important. The current US doctrine suffers from GWOT syndrome. The assumption that wars will be fought quickly – which is unlikely for this scenario. To be able to project power is to demonstrate the current status quo can hold.

Final Thoughts.

There things I think a casual geopolitical observer needs to watch:

• Political maneuvering. You must look at how the geopolitical relations evolve in the Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and Philippines. How the US, China, and even Russia affect the sustainability of the US to project power in East Asia. It doesn’t mean a clear realignment either. Realignments are likely to be subtle – economic first and political – while they maintain strategic ambiguity. If China offers an economic alternative that outweighs American security guarantees, political alignment will shift. The balance of power does not rest on sentiment. It is preserved by the calculation of interests.
• Naval and military build up. Military forces do not exist to respond to threats. They exist to shape the battlefield before a threat emerges. The U.S. Pacific presence is structured around this principle. Bases, naval deployments, and airpower are not positioned defensively. They are forward-deployed to dictate the terms of engagement. China’s naval expansion is not a sign of war—it is a signal of intent. It is an attempt to alter the strategic environment in ways that reduce American freedom of action. The question is whether Beijing can extend its reach beyond the First Island Chain before Washington reinforces its own position
• Logistics. No power has ever dominated the Pacific without first mastering the problem of distance. The U.S. built its empire on its ability to project force across oceans while ensuring its supply lines remained intact. Logistics are not a secondary concern; they are the foundation of strategy. Bases in Japan, South Korea, Guam, and Hawaii serve a single function—to reduce the gap between the American mainland and the battlespace. Every war game, every simulation, every historical lesson points to the same conclusion. Without secure lines of resupply, power projection collapses. As long as the US can do this, China’s projection of power moves South and West. It cannot meaningfully influence the Americas until it breaks this line.

U.S. bases in the Pacific are strategic buffer. But they are also a means of shaping the battlefield that China must fight on in the Pacific. The bases and alliances help limit the options.

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